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Abstract— The notion of an ad hoc network is a new paradigm that allows mobile hosts (nodes) to 
communicate without relying on a predefined infrastructure to keep the network connected. Most 
nodes are assumed to be mobile and communication is assumed to be wireless. The mobility of nodes 
in an ad-hoc network means that both the population and the topology of the network are highly dy-
namic. It is very difficult to design a once-for-all intrusion detection system. A secure protocol should 
atleast include mechanisms against known attack types. In addition, it should provide a scheme to 
easily add new security features in the future. The paper includes the detailed description of Proposed 
Intrusion Detection System based on Local Reputation Scheme. The proposed System also includes 
concept of Redemption and Fading these are mechanism that allow nodes previously considered mali-
cious to become a part of the network again. The simulation of the proposed system is to be done us-
ing NS-2 simulator. 
 
Index Terms—IDS, MANET, AD HOC 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-
configuring network that is formed automatically 
by a collection of mobile nodes without the help of 
a fixed infrastructure or centralized management. 
Each node is equipped with a wireless transmitter 
and receiver, which allow it to communicate with 
other nodes in its radio communication range. In 
order for a node to forward a packet to a node 
that is out of its radio range, the cooperation of 
other nodes in the network is needed; this is 
known as multi-hop communication. Therefore, 
each node must act as both a host and a router at 
the same time. The network topology frequently 
changes due to the mobility of mobile nodes as 
they move within, move into, or move out of the 
network. There are both passive and active at-
tacks in MANETs. For passive attacks, packets 
containing secret information might be eave-
sdropped, which violates confidentiality. Active 
attacks, including injecting packets to invalid des-
tinations into the network, deleting packets, mod-
ifying the contents of packets, and impersonating 
other nodes violate availability, integrity, authenti-
cation, and non-repudiation. Proactive approach-
es such as cryptography and authentication were 
first brought into consideration, and many tech-
niques have been proposed and implemented. 
However, these applications are not sufficient. If 
we have the ability to detect the attack once it 
comes into the network, we can stop it from doing 
any damage to the system or any data. Here is 
where the intrusion detection system comes in. 
Intrusion detection can be defined as a 
process of monitoring activities in a system, which 
can be a computer or network system. The me-
chanism by which this is achieved is called an in-
trusion detection system (IDS). An IDS collects 
activity information and then analyzes it to deter-
mine whether there are any activities that violate 
the security rules. Once an IDS determines that 
an unusual activity or an activity that is known to 
be an attack occurs, it then generates an alarm to 
alert the security administrator. In addition, IDS 
can also initiate a proper response to the mali-
cious activity. 
Many historical events have shown that in-
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trusion prevention techniques alone, such as en-
cryption and authentication, which are usually a 
first line of defense, are not sufficient. As the sys-
tem become more complex, there are also more 
weaknesses, which lead to more security prob-
lems. Intrusion detection can be used as a 
second wall of defense to protect the network 
from such problems. If the intrusion is detected, a 
response can be initiated to prevent or minimize 
damage to the system. 
Some assumptions are made in order for 
intrusion detection systems to work .The first as-
sumption are that user and program activities are 
observable. The second assumption, which is 
more important, is that normal and intrusive activi-
ties must have distinct behaviors, as intrusion de-
tection must capture and analyze system activity 
to determine if the system is under attack. 
Intrusion detection [1] can be classified 
based on audit data as either host based or net-
work-based. A network-based IDS captures and 
analyzes packets from network traffic while a 
host-based IDS uses operating system or applica-
tion logs in its analysis. Based on detection tech-
niques, IDS can also be classified into three cate-
gories as follows. 
 
Anomaly detection systems: The normal pro-
files (or normal behaviors) of users are kept in the 
system. The system compares the captured data 
with these profiles, and then treats any activity 
that deviates from the baseline as a possible in-
trusion by informing system administrators or in-
itializing a proper response. 
 
Misuse detection systems: The system keeps 
patterns (or signatures) of known attacks and 
uses them to compare with the captured data. 
Any matched pattern is treated as an intrusion. 
Like a virus detection system, it cannot detect 
new kinds of attacks. 
 
Specification-based detection: The system de-
fines a set of constraints that describe the correct 
operation of a program or protocol. Then, it moni-
tors the execution of the program with respect to 
the defined constraints. 
2  INTRUSION DETECTION IN MANET 
Many intrusion detection systems have been pro-
posed in traditional wired networks, where all traf-
fic must go through switches, routers, or gate-
ways. Hence, IDS can be added to and imple-
mented in these devices easily. On the other 
hand, MANETs do not have such devices. More-
over, the medium is wide open, so both legitimate 
and malicious users can access it. Furthermore, 
there is no clear separation between normal and 
unusual activities in a mobile environment. Since 
nodes can move arbitrarily, false routing informa-
tion could be from a compromised node or a node 
that has outdated information. Thus, the current 
IDS techniques on wired networks cannot be ap-
plied directly to MANETs. Many intrusion detec-
tion systems have been proposed to suit the cha-
racteristics of MANETs, some of which will be 
discussed in the next sections 
 
3. INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNIQUES FOR 
NODE COOPERATION IN MANET 
There are several proposed techniques and pro-
tocols to detect such misbehavior in order to 
avoid those nodes, and some schemes also pro-
pose punishment as well: 
Watchdog and Path rater: A watchdog identifies 
the misbehaving nodes by eavesdropping on the 
transmission of the next hop. A path rater then 
helps to find the routes that do not contain those 
nodes. In DSR, the routing information is defined 
at the source node. This routing information is 
passed together with the message through inter-
mediate nodes until it reaches the destination. 
Therefore, each intermediate node in the path 
should know who the next hop node is. 
Reputation Based Schemes: Reputation systems 
are used in many areas of electronic transactions, 
such as eBay and Amazon. Reputation mechan-
isms are applied to wireless mobile ad hoc net-
work to address threats arising from uncoopera-
tive nodes. They rely on neighbor monitoring to 
dynamically assess the trustworthiness of neigh-
bor nodes and excluding untrustworthy nodes. 
Several reputation systems have been proposed 
to mitigate selfishness and stimulate cooperation 
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in mobile ad hoc network, including: CONFI-
DANT, CORE, OCEAN  
4 Proposed Intrusion Detection System 
It is a simple reputation based scheme, called Lo-
cal Reputation System to mitigate misbehavior 
and enforce cooperation. Different from global 
reputation Schemes such as CONFIDANT and 
CORE, our solution uses local reputation only. 
Each node only keeps the reputation values of all 
its one hop neighbors. Local Reputation System 
addresses the problem of node cooperation in self 
organized ad hoc networks. In these networks, 
nodes may not belong to single authority and 
don’t have common goals. By Self Organizing 
mean that regular function of network depends on 
End Users operation. In this Trust is associated 
with its reputation value. There are three trust le-
vels and we use a trust value, T, to represent the 
trustworthiness of a node. A node A considers 
another node B either 
 trustworthy, with T = 1, 
 untrustworthy, with T = -1, or 
 trustworthy undecided, with T = 0 
A trustworthy node is a regular (well-behaved) 
node that can be trusted. An untrustworthy node 
is a misbehaved node and should be avoid. A 
node with undecided trustworthiness is usually a 
new node in the neighborhood. It may be a regu-
lar or a misbehaved node, depending on its future 
performance. 
Every node keeps a reputation table, 
which associates a reputation value with each of 
its neighbors. It updates the reputation table 
based on direct observation only. No global repu-
tation value is calculated, and no indirect reputa-
tion message is distributed. Reputation values R 
are between a range Rmin < R < Rmax, and there 
are two threshold, Ru > Rmin for untrustworthy 
and Rt < Rmax for trustworthy. For a node N with 
reputation value R and trust value T, 
 T = 1 (N is trustworthy), if Rt < R 
<Rmax, 
 T = -1 (N is not trustworthy), if Rmin 
<R < Ru, 
 T = 0 (N is trustworthy undecided), if 
Ru <R < Rt. 
A new node, either a node that just entered the 
network or a node that has moved to a new 
neighborhood, will be assigned a reputation value 
between Ru and Rt because its trustworthiness is 
unknown.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Fig1. IDS based on Reputation 
Monitor 
The Monitor, holds the responsibilty of monitoring 
activities in the Neighborhood using PACKs (Pas-
sive ACKnowledgements) which have been pro-
vided as a feature in the DSR protocol specifica-
tions  as Promiscuous Mode. Every node regis-
ters all the data packets sent by it to next node 
and when it receives packets in promiscuous 
mode, it matches those to the queue of registered 
packets present in its buffer. After a fixed time in-
terval -termed as the Timing Window, nodes 
make a log of number of packets for which they 
haven’t received acknowledgment in the form of 
PACK and communicate it to the reputation man-
ager. In existing Reputation systems every packet 
is kept waiting for its PACK for a fixed time inter-
val, in contrast we have used the concept of Tim-
ing Window, which gives us flexibility of checking 
timeout on fixed intervals (that is after every 
second) rather checking it on basis of each indi-
vidual packet’s timeout. Monitor maintains a log of 
activity of next neighbor for each Window and 
sends it to Reputation manager. 
 
Reputation Manager 
Reputation System assigns and maintain reputa-
tion of different nodes.Each node maintains only 
reputation value of its one hop neighbor. reputa-
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tion of any node can change by three means: 
a.By Self observation 
b.WARNING Message, issued by neighboring 
nodes 
c.Avoid List, appended to the RREQ/RREP head-
er. 
 
All three ways have associated reputation weights 
with them, giving maximum weight to self obser-
vation. The reputation is updated after every time 
window. A node may be tagged as Normal, Sus-
picious or Malicious depending on reputation as-
sociated with it .After each time window Reputa-
tion system receives activity log of next hop 
neighbor from monitor with number of packets for 
which it does not receive PACK, called as Missing 
or Dropped Packets. The number of missing is 
then compared with Malicious Drop Threshold 
and if it is lesser, then reputation manager gives 
positive performance else negative. A node is de-
clared malicious only through self observation. 
When ever any node has a  reputation in Mali-
cious category ant that also receive s any new 
warning message or avoid list ,system performs 
Trace Test , a test designed to check authentic of 
node .In this test deciding node generates a fake 
data packet and forward it to node in question. If 
next node forward it successfully ,then system 
gives it a performance appraisal and clears its 
account else node is declared as Malicious. If the 
node is actually malicious one then it drop the test 
packet and Monitor shall report its activity to repu-
tation manager. 
 
Calculation And Updation of Reputation Value: 
Local Reputation System  uses local reputation 
value, where each node maintains only reputation 
values of its one hop neighbors. The reputation 
value is updated based only on its direct observa-
tion of the neighbors, no second hand reputation 
information exchanged and integrated .Suppose a 
Node A behaves regularly.  Everytime it forward a 
message ,its one hop neighbor observe its Nor-
mal behavior and increase its reputation value  by 
say w. Rx(A) mean Reputation Value of node A in 
node x reputation table. 
 Rx(A) =  Rx(A) + w  
 
Suppose M is a malicious node and drops the 
message from its previous node, N. Then there 
are several different cases. We use the figures 
below to illustrate each of them. In these figures, 
a circle describes the one-hop neighborhood of a 
node, a solid vector describes the forwarding of a 
message, a dotted vector describes the forward-
ing of a trace, a dashed vector describes non for-
warding (either a message or a trace).  
 
Case 1: N Sent a message to M but M failed to 
forward it 
 
Fig 2. N Sent a message to M but M failed to forward it 
 
For every node X in, which is a one-hop neighbor 
of both N and M, X detects the misbehavior and 
reduces the reputation value of M by y, where y > 
z. That is, 
 
                   Rx(M) = Rx(M) – y      
Case 2 M has forwarded the message but not 
forwarded trace. 
 
Fig 3.M has forwarded the message but not forwarded trace. 
 
For every node X, which is a one-hop neighbor of 
M, but not a one-hop neighbor of N,X realizes that 
M has not forwarded the message when it gets the 
trace, then X will reduce M's reputation value by y. 
Thus, all one-hop neighbors of M reduce its repu-
tation by y. That is, 
                 Rx(M) = Rx(M) – y, X(- N(M) 
  
Case 3: M has not forwarded the message, and 
has also dropped the trace. 
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Fig 4. M has not forwarded the message, and has 
also dropped trace. 
 
Rx(M) = Rx(M) – t 
 
Path Manager 
The path manager performs trivial path manage-
ment functions in collaboration with DSR core. 
Path ranking is done according to path priority 
formula. Updating path-cache on various events 
such as those when new nodes are declared a 
malicious or a malicious node is taken back in 
network; taking decision on receiving route re-
quest or traffic from malicious nodes are a few 
responsibilities of the path manager. Concept of 
avoid list has been added to path manager, which 
is a list of malicious nodes that a certain node 
possesses and is appended to the RREQ header 
whenever a route request is issued by some 
node. Nodes which find themselves in avoid list 
do not process the packet and may simply drop it. 
During RREP, only a path with clean nodes is 
preferred over those containing suspicious nodes 
and malicious nodes. Replies from such nodes 
are also dropped and nodes do not process re-
quest and/or forward data packets from such 
nodes. If during traffic flow, a new node is de-
clared malicious, then, all paths containing it are 
deleted from route cache and a route error is 
generated, stating that their link to the destination 
node has been broken.  
 
Redemption and Fading 
Redemption and Fading are introduced in our de-
sign to allow nodes previously considered mali-
cious to become apart of the network again. MA-
NETs run on cooperation and collaboration of 
peer nodes and no one gets benefited without 
cooperating with each other. Trace test is crucial 
for nodes in suspicious category and node may 
fail this test due to various reasons like transient 
link failures, congestion or resetting of the net-
work interface etc. and once they fail this test, 
they are declared as malicious. To account for 
these problems, our system uses the fading me-
chanism. After a certain inactivity period the repu-
tation of a node is improved by a certain prede-
fined fading rate and finally the node is moved 
from the malicious list to middle of suspicious cat-
egory. But, the node is not given neutral rating  so 
that if the node again misbehaves then it is im-
mediately put in malicious list and all transactions 
through that node are blocked. Here, inactivity  
period means no appearance in any WARNING 
messages or avoid list. 
Following algorithms give a concise idea 
of the Route Discovery phase, Monitoring mode 
and Trace test feature of our system. The algo-
rithm for Route Discovery phase is: 
 
SENDER 
1 Generate RREQ Packet 
2 Pack Malicious List in RREQ Header as Avoid List 
3 Propagate Request 
 OTHER NODES 
4 if (Own name present in Avoid List) then 
5 Drop Request 
6 else 
7 Scan Avoid List 
8 Update Node’s Reputation 
9 Append its own malicious list to RREQ header avoiding 
repetition 
10 if (Node is same as Destination in RREQ) then 
11 Prepare Reply 
12 else 
13 Add itself in route and propagate 
14 end if 
15 end if 
 
The above algorithm presents a node’s behavior 
during route establishment phase. Sender of the 
RREQ just initiates the route discovery process 
with avoid list of malicious nodes packed in the 
RREQ packet header. The remaining nodes after 
receiving such requests process the avoid list 
attached in the received RREQ header. If a 
matching entry is found for their own name in the 
list, the node drops the request. Otherwise, the 
reputation of the other nodes present in the avoid 
list is updated. If the receiving node is the desti-
nation for which the RREQ has been sent, then it 
prepares a route reply else it appends its own 
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malicious list in the header to the existing avoid 
list avoiding repetitions and propagates the route 
request. Below is the algorithm For Monitor 
Mode Phase: 
 
MONITOR MODE 
Self Observation- 
1 if (Performance is below normal Threshold) then 
2 Negative reputation update 
3 else 
4 Positive reputation update 
5  if (reputation is above 0) then 
6 SET reputation = 0 
7 end if 
8 end if 
WARNING MESSAGE PROPAGATION 
9 if (WARNING MSG && NEIGHBOR) then 
10 if (Reputation below Suspicious Threshold) then 
11 Perform Trace Test 
12 if (Trace Test is Passed) then 
13 Assign normal reputation 
14 else 
15 declare as Malicious 
16 spread Warning Message 
17 end if 
18 end if 
19 else 
20 decrease reputation 
21: end if 
  
Now, we’ll discuss the algorithm for trace test 
 
Trace Test 
1 Identify target Node 
2 Generate fake data packet with route via target node 
3 Send packet to target node and wait for its PACK 
4 if (PACK is found) then 
5 test Passed 
6 Set reputation to default 
7 else 
8 test Failed 
9 Declare node as malicious and broadcast Warning   
message 
10 end if 
                              
Trace test is designed specifically for immediate 
neighbors to test whether a particular node is ma-
licious or not and is only performed on nodes in 
suspicious state. In this test a dummy data packet 
with time to live (TTL) equal to 2 is sent to a node 
in question via last known route through that 
node. The sender node overhears traffic of the 
node in question in promiscuous mode. If the 
node on which trace test is being performed suc-
cessfully forwards the test packet to next hop then 
its reputation is set to default. In case it fails, then 
it is immediately put into malicious category and a 
warning message is broadcasted in the imme-
diate neighborhood 
In case, the dummy packet is genuinely 
dropped because of bad channel conditions the 
node may be classified as malicious. However, it 
still has an opportunity to become a part of net-
work again through redemption and fading me-
chanism, as explained earlier. This is done be-
cause the system only trusts first hand informa-
tion for putting a node into malicious category, 
thus, giving self observation the highest weigh-
tage. The weight age assigned to warning mes-
sage and avoid list is comparatively less than self 
observation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Mobile adhoc networks have a number of signifi-
cant security issues which cannot be solved alone 
by simple IDS. In this, we have to critically ex-
amine the existing systems and outline their 
strength and shortcomings. We have opted an 
approach for our system in terms of mode of in-
formation propagation among nodes. The goal is 
to design a system incorporating the best traits of 
all existing systems without incurring extra routing 
overhead. Trace test and Timing window and Re-
demption and Fading mechanism are some new 
concepts that have to be introduced in this sys-
tem. We will discuss various attacks in ad hoc 
network. In Future the simulation of the proposed 
work will be done using NS-2. 
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